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Abstract Transfer restrictions have a long tradition in professional sports but
came under heavy attack in recent years (e.g. Bosman ruling, Monti system). Based
on a bargaining model with stochastic player productivity, we show that less
restrictive transfer rules reallocate ex post bargaining power from players to clubs.
This reallocation is efficient and in the ex ante self-interest of players. The right to
charge transfer fees enables clubs to insure their players. The players, in turn,
benefit by converting risky future income into riskless current income. Overall,
player utility is higher under more than under less restrictive transfer rules.
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1 Introduction
Employment relations in football are governed by a set of distinct institutional
mechanisms: contracts between players and clubs, employment law and a regulatory
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framework known as the transfer system enforced by the football governing bodies
(FIFA and the national associations).
The crucial effect of the transfer system is the creation of a unilateral property right
for the clubs over the services of players. As a consequence of the transfer system the
players are not able to leave their current club and sign with another club without the
current club’s explicit consent. The football governing bodies enjoy a certain degree of
freedom to self-regulate as sport is considered to differ from other industries because
of well-known peculiarities (Neale 1964). Until 1995 the football authorities were able
to impose the transfer system on all employment relations in football. Players out-of-
contract as well as players in-contract required the permission of their current club
before signing with another club. In this sense all employment in football was
governed by the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ and clubs only agreed to release
players conditional on receiving adequate remuneration through a transfer fee.
Since 1995 the ability of the football governing bodies to apply the transfer
system has been restricted in two major steps. In December 1995 the European
Court of Justice issued its famous Bosman verdict,1 which ruled that the transfer
system could no longer be applied to out-of-contract players. As a consequence,
players now become free agents after expiration of their contracts and their former
employer has no right to demand transfer remuneration if they sign with new clubs.
Finally in 2001, the European Commission further restricted the ability of the
football governing bodies to self-regulate the employment relations of football. In
what is known as the ‘Monti system’ after Commissioner Mario Monti,2 the football
governing bodies had to adapt their regulatory framework known as the FIFA
transfer rules to a whole set of new requirements.3 The Bosman verdict changed the
situation in that the transfer system remained applicable to in-contract players only.
However, clubs and players were still free to deliberately place employment
relations under the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ by excluding the advent of
contract expiration through extended contract durations. By limiting contract
durations the Monti system rendered this avoidance strategy more difficult.
The standard interpretation of these restrictions in the application of the transfer
system stresses the increased freedom of movement for players, which translates into a
relative gain in market power and therefore into higher salaries. While we do not deny
the link between freedom of movement and market power, we question that the
1 The Bosman verdict had the following background. In 1990, the contract of Jean Marc Bosman, a
professional football player, with his Belgian club R.C. Liegois expired. After the club offered him a new
contract worth only 25% of his former contract, Bosman wanted to transfer to the French club U.S.
Dunkerque. According to the transfer system of the International Football Association, however, the
Belgian Football Association had to send Bosman’s registration certificate to the French Football
Association before Bosman was eligible to play for U.S. Dunkerque. Since R.C. Liegois was not satisfied
with the transfer payment offered by U.S. Dunkerque, the Belgian Football Association withheld
Bosman’s registration certificate. As a result, Bosman could not play for U.S. Dunkerque and took his
case to the courts.
2 The new FIFA transfer rules were adopted after more than 2 years of discussions between the European
Commission—in particular, Commissioner Mario Monti—the European Football Association (UEFA),
and FIFA.
3 We will only focus on one aspect of the Monti system in our model, the limitation of contract durations
in football to a maximum of 5 years.
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salaries will ultimately be driven up by the reforms. There may be more than one
channel of influence between the reforms and the salaries. Our model looks at the
employment relation in football from a different perspective. We develop a model
which captures an important and widely overlooked aspect of this employment
relation: the allocation of risk. The basic intuition of our approach can be stated as
follows. Players and clubs alike do not know how the productivity of a player will
develop in future periods. Given that players perform in public and taking into account
the importance of reputation effects, pride and career concerns in sport it seems
unlikely that players should shirk on effort. Instead, it seems more adequate to treat
productivity variations as a manifestation of risk. Moreover, on average, the career
duration of a professional football player is very short compared with other labour-
markets. According to Frick et al. (2007) ‘more than one third of all players
‘disappear’ again after their first season and only one career out of 12 lasts for 10 years
and more.’ During this short career duration, the high performance uncertainty creates
strong incentives for the player to buy insurance against income uncertainty.
If risk is the key driver behind the performance uncertainty of football players
then there is an obvious potential for value creation in this industry. Risk-averse
players could buy insurance against future income uncertainty when contracting
with risk-neutral clubs, which have the possibility to diversify the risk of
productivity variations within their portfolio of players and also through diversified
ownership structures. However, if the player turns out to be more productive in the
course of time than assumed when writing down the initial contract, he has
incentives to renegotiate the contract. The same holds for the club if the player turns
out to be a ‘bad risk’.
The third institutional mechanism governing employment relations in football
comes into play here, labour law. De facto labour law in most European countries
makes long-term employment contracts asymmetrically incomplete since it is
possible to legally bind employers to fulfil long-term contracts but it is practically
impossible to bind the employee. There is no ‘shadow of the law’ that prevents
players from accepting better job offers. Since ‘good risk’ players would therefore
renegotiate the contract and receive wages reflecting their marginal productivity,
clubs would be left with all the ‘bad risks’. Given this assumption, clubs cannot
offer value creating insurance services. In this context the transfer system imposed
by the governing bodies of football works as a surrogate which makes insurance
contracts complete.4 ‘Good risk’ players know that they will have to pay for the
insurance, be it through the transfer fee or by continuing to play for a salary below
marginal productivity. It is the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ which allowed
players to commit to fulfilling their contracts. It is the ‘shadow of the transfer
system’ which enabled the efficient allocation of risk in this industry.
4 Note that the contracts considered in our paper are related to non-standard contracts in the light of the
new institutional economics by Williamson (1985, 1996). Williamson points out that ‘non-standard and
unfamiliar forms of contract are presumed to have efficiency rather than monopoly purposes’ (Williamson
2003). He also claims that ‘until recently the primary economic explanation for non-standard or
unfamiliar business practices was monopoly’ (Williamson 1985, p. 17) whereas ‘transaction cost
economics interprets contractual and organizational variety principally in economizing terms’ (William-
son 2003).
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The Bosman verdict restricted the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ to the market
for in-contract players. However, it provided freedom for players and clubs to
voluntarily position their transactions under the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ by
extending the duration of contracts, which is exactly what happened in the industry.5
The Monti system makes it more difficult to position transactions under the ‘shadow
of the transfer system’ by limiting contract durations, thereby making the efficient
allocation of risk more difficult. In our model we show that risk-averse players may
lose from the reforms since they would benefit from a conversion of risky future
income into risk-less current income under the ‘shadow of the transfer system’.
Before proceeding with the model, we will give a short overview of the related
literature: Rottenberg (1956) presents the first economic analysis of transfer
restrictions in professional team sports. He describes the mandatory lifelong tie of a
player to his original club in U.S. Major League Baseball combined with the club’s
right to demand transfer compensations from other clubs in case that the player
transfers as the result of the league’s market power. According to Rottenberg, these
labour-market restrictions preclude players from earning salaries equal to their
marginal productivity.6 Since new clubs cannot offer an in-contract player more
than his marginal productivity minus transfer compensations to the old club, the
player is not able to bargain his salary up to his marginal productivity.
Our model differs from this view. We show that the existence of transfer
restrictions combined with the right to demand transfer compensations does not
mean that players are worse off or that any kind of market power is exerted upon
them. To the contrary, our model highlights that the players’ loss in ex post
bargaining power is compensated by an increase in ex ante bargaining power.
According to our knowledge, Rottenberg was also the first to conclude that the right
to demand transfer payments does not result in an inefficient allocation of playing
talent. If football contracts are incomplete with respect to transfer fees, a player’s
current club can always renegotiate the transfer fee in order to maximize profits by
transferring the player to the club where he is most productive. Carbonell-Nicolau and
Comin (2005) recently provided empirical evidence for the claim that football
contracts are incomplete with respect to transfer fees. Based on a data set with
information about football contracts, transfer payments, and several measures of a
players’ value in the Spanish Primera Division for the three seasons from 1999/00 to
2001/02. Carbonell-Nicolau and Comin show that the player’s contractually specified
transfer fee has a large positive effect on the new club’s total cost of hiring the player.
Burguet et al. (2002) show that transfer restrictions are a common feature in
labour-markets in which a worker’s (invariant) productivity is unknown ex ante but
can be observed by outsiders after the worker has signed a contract and works for an
incumbent firm. In these markets, ex post competition for workers is likely to be
vigorous and outsiders can earn positive rents by signing workers with the desired
productivity characteristics. Transfer restrictions allow the pair incumbent firm-
worker to expropriate at least some of the outsiders’ rents. In their model, transfer
5 Feess et al. (2004) show that after the Bosman verdict the average contract length has increased
considerably, e.g. in the German Bundesliga from 2.43 to 2.91 years.
6 Similar arguments are presented by Demmert (1973) and Scully (1974).
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restrictions have no efficiency effect. Without transfer restrictions no firm would be
willing to sign a worker with unknown productivity characteristics. Workers would
have to work without a wage before their productivity becomes common
knowledge. Transfer restrictions only affect the distribution of profits between
incumbent firm, worker and outsiders. This result of Burguet et al. is due to their
assumption that worker productivity is invariant over time. We believe that a
football player’s productivity (playing strength) varies significantly during his
career and, more importantly, these variations cannot be predicted. There are many
players who were believed to become superstars, but were never able to meet
expectations. Similarly, there are at least as many players who became much better
players than initially predicted by experts. Once we introduce unknown productivity
variations over a player’s career, risk allocation becomes a crucial feature of welfare
considerations and transfer restrictions are no longer efficiency neutral.
Based on the bargaining model of Burguet et al. (2002),7 Feess and Muehlheusser
(2003) argue that the prohibition of transfer restrictions reallocates bargaining power
from a player’s current club to potentially new clubs. This reallocation of bargaining
power reduces the current club’s incentive to invest in the player’s human capital
because the current club has to bear the investment costs without being able to
appropriate all investment benefits if the player transfers to a new club.
Antonioni and Cubbin (2000) analyze the economic effect of the Bosman ruling.
Based on empirical evidence and the theory of real options, Antonioni and Cubbin
argue that the Bosman ruling had little effect on player salaries, investment in
human capital and transfer activity. They attribute the rise in salaries to increasing
television revenues. According to Antonioni and Cubbin, a club’s incentive to invest
in training players is not impaired, because the club can always exercise its option to
sell a player before his contract expires. At the same time, no club will wait until the
contract of a desired player has expired so that the player becomes available for free
because no club will take the risk to lose the desired player to a rival club who does
not wait until the contract has expired. Like Burguet et al. (2002) and Feess and
Muehlheusser (2003), Antonioni and Cubbin (2000) do not analyze the effect of
transfer restrictions on the allocation of risk.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the model.
In Sect. 3 we analyze the role of transfer restriction and distinguish two regimes:
short-term contracts in and out of the ‘shadow of the transfer system’, respectively.
Section 4 characterizes the relationship between the ‘shadow of the transfer system’
and the pre-Bosman, Bosman and Monti transfer system. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Model specification
Our model consists of a representative player, who has a career horizon of two periods,
and two representative clubs, club S and club L. The player is assumed to be risk-averse
7 Burguet et al. (2002) and Feess and Muehlheusser (2002, 2003) model the bargaining process as a
simultaneous Nash bargaining game in which the player simultaneously bargains with his old and his new
club. The Nash bargaining solution in each individual bargaining game serves as the threat point of the
other bargaining game.
Eur J Law Econ (2008) 26:129–151 133
123
whereas the clubs are assumed to be risk-neutral since they have the possibility of
diversifying the risk of productivity variations within their portfolio of players and also
through diversified ownership structures.8 The utility of the player is given by his
salary whereas the utility of each club corresponds to its profit. The total expected
utility (i.e. expected utility over two periods) of the risk-averse player is defined as the
sum of the risk-free first-period salary and the security equivalent of the risky second-
period salary. The total expected utility of the risk-neutral club is defined as the sum of
the expected first-period profit and the expected second-period profit.
The player’s productivity in t [ {1,2} is a random variable with Markov property
denoted St at club S and Lt at club L. To abstract from moral hazard problems, we
assume that the player’s productivity in each period is exogenous.9 It follows a
stochastic process characterized by the binomial tree model presented in Fig. 1.
The player’s productivity in each period either increases in club S by a fixed
amount, s [ 0, with probability p [ (0,1), or decreases by the same amount with
probability (1 - p). For club L this fixed amount is given by l [ 0.10
With probability p the player’s productivity increases, leading in club S to a first-
period productivity of S1 = e0 + s. With probability (1 - p) the player’s produc-
tivity decreases, leading in club S to a first-period productivity of S1 = e0 - s.
In the event that the player’s productivity has increased (decreased) during period
1, the player’s productivity will increase during period 2 with probability p, leading
in club S to a second-period productivity of S2 = e0 + 2s (S2 = e0). With
probability (1 - p) the player’s productivity will decrease during period 2, leading
in club S to a second-period productivity of S2 = e0 (S2 = e0 - 2s).
11
The probability p is assumed to be common knowledge. Without loss of
generality, we assume throughout this analysis that s \ l. Hence, we can interpret
club S as a ‘small-market’ club where variations of the player’s productivity only
cause a low productivity alteration. Club L then is a ‘large-market’ club where
variations of the player’s productivity cause a high productivity alteration.
Moreover, we call a player with p [ 1/2 (p B 1/2) ‘high-talented’ (‘low-talented’).
At the beginning of each period the player and the two clubs have common
expectations about the player’s productivity (playing strength) in this and future
periods. During each period the player and the clubs observe the player’s current
playing strength. From this information both will update their expectation regarding
the player’s productivity in future periods. The terms Et[St+1|St] and Et[Lt+1|Lt]
denote the expected value of St+1 and Lt+1 based on the information available in t
8 Our main insights still hold if the club is less risk-averse than the player. Our results will also remain
valid if the club is more risk-averse than the player but can diversify most of the risk by signing contracts
with many players.
9 More realistically, a player’s performance is the combined result of the player’s (exogenous) talent and
(endogenous) effort. Nevertheless, our abstraction can be justified with two arguments. First, players have
pride and try to maximize their chance of winning by providing full effort. Second, since performance of
football players is perfectly observable, players who do not provide full effort will be regarded as less
talented than they actually are.
10 We refer to the time-span between t = 0 and t = 1 as ‘period 1’ and between t = 1 and t = 2 as
‘period 2’.
11 Analogous for club L with l instead of s.
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(before St+1 and Lt+1 are revealed) conditional on the player’s productivity St and
Lt.
12 In t = 0, the player’s productivity is assumed to be common knowledge and
given for both clubs by e0 [ 0, i.e. S0 = L0 = e0.
13
In t = 0, the player’s expected first-period productivities E0[S1] in club S and
E0[L1] in club L are computed as
E0½S1 ¼ e0 þ sð2p  1Þ and E0½L1 ¼ e0 þ lð2p  1Þ:
Moreover, in t = 0 both clubs have expectations about the player’s second-period
productivity, denoted E0[S2] for club S and E0[L2] for club L, which are given by
E0½S2 ¼ e0 þ 2sð2p  1Þ and E0½L2 ¼ e0 þ 2lð2p  1Þ:
With s \ l and p \ 1/2 it gives: E0[S1] [ E0[L1] and E0[S2] [ E0[L2]. Hence, in
t = 0 a low-talented player is expected to be more productive in both periods in the
small-market club S than in the large-market club L. The reverse is true for a high-
talented player.
In t = 1, the player, club S, and club L observe the player’s current productivity and
update their expectation regarding his productivity in period 2. If the player’s
e0
e0+s
e0-s
e0+2s
e0-2s
p
1-p
p
p
1-p
1-p
e0
t=1 t=2t=0
Fig. 1 Development of the player’s productivity in club S
12 For notational clarity we write in the subsequent analysis Et[St+1] and Et[Lt+1] instead of Et[St+1|St]
and Et[Lt+1|Lt].
13 The information set at t = 0 does not have to be empty. Before starting a professional career a player
usually played in minor or youth leagues. The market can form its expectation regarding a rookie player’s
productivity based on the player’s past performance.
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productivity has increased during period 1 we denote the expected second-period
productivity in t = 1 at club S with E1[S2
+] and at club L with E1[L2
+]. In the other case, we
write E1[S2
-] and E1[L2
-]. The expected second-period productivities are computed as
E1½Sþ2  ¼ e0 þ 2sp and E1½Lþ2  ¼ e0 þ 2lp;
E1½S2  ¼ e0 þ 2sðp  1Þ and E1½L2  ¼ e0 þ 2lðp  1Þ:
In order to guarantee a positive expected second-period productivity for all p [ (0,1)
we assume: e0 [ 2l(p-1).
If the player’s productivity has increased (decreased) during period 1, then in
t = 1, each type of player is expected to be more productive at club L (club S) than
at club S (club L). Formally,
E1½Sþ2 \E1½Lþ2  and E1½S2 [ E1½L2 8p 2 ð0; 1Þ: ð1Þ
The clubs compete for the player by offering contracts which specify the number
of periods the player will play for the club and the salary paid by the club to the
player in each of the respective periods. We distinguish two regimes:
In Sect. 3.1 we consider short-term contracts in a restricted transfer system where
all employment is governed by the ‘shadow of the transfer system’. We assume that
the contract between the player and his initial club expires after period 1, but the
player cannot transfer to a new club without the permission of his initial club. In this
case, the initial club has the right to demand an unlimited transfer fee from the other
club for the player. If the initial club is not satisfied with the amount offered by the
other club, the initial club has the right to prevent the player from transferring to the
other club. This right gives the initial club strong bargaining power, because it
enables this club to prevent a transfer by demanding an exorbitantly high transfer
fee. The other club, however, cannot be forced to pay any amount demanded by the
initial club. The new club is free to withdraw its offer if it cannot reach an
agreement with the initial club regarding the transfer fee and with the player
regarding the player’s second-period salary.
In Sect. 3.2 we consider short-term contracts in an unrestricted transfer system,
i.e. without the ‘shadow of the transfer system’. The contract between the player and
his initial club expires after period 1 and the player is free to sign a contract with
another club without the permission of his initial club. Moreover, the initial club
does not receive any transfer fee.
3 The role of transfer restrictions
3.1 Short-term contracts in the ‘shadow of the transfer system’
We model the bargaining process in t = 0 between the player and the clubs
concerning the player’s first-period salary as a pair of simultaneous negotiations in
Nash bargaining fashion: one for each club vis-a`-vis the player, using as threat
points in each negotiation what each expects from the other.14 This bargaining
14 Note that this approach is similar to Burguet et al. (2002).
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model captures the cooperative situation between the clubs and the player on the
one hand and the non-cooperative situation between the two clubs on the other hand
(both clubs compete against each other by offering contracts to the player).
Moreover, the two clubs and the player take into account that the ‘shadow of the
transfer system’ prevents the out-of-contract player from signing a valid contract
with another club without the permission of his current club. Besides the relevant
threat points, we have to compute the player’s and club’s total expected utility.
Formally, we have to distinguish two cases: (a) the player signs a short-term
contract with club S in t = 0 and (b) the player signs a short-term contract with club
L in t = 0.15
We proceed by assuming that the player has signed a short-term contract which
specifies a first-period salary of wSr;1 with club S in t = 0:
16
(i) If the player’s productivity has increased during period 1 (which happens with
probability p), we know by Eq. 1 that each type of player will achieve a higher
expected second-period productivity at the large-market club L compared with
the small-market club S. According to the Coase theorem, the player will
transfer to club L since the player is then allocated efficiently.
But how will the (expected) productivity gain that is generated through the
transfer be divided between the player, club S and club L?
In contrast with the bargaining game in t = 0, where a solution concept which
captured the partial non-cooperative nature of the game was needed, we now have a
cooperative bargaining situation between all three parties since we know ex ante
that the grand coalition will form. Thus, we need now a solution concept that
captures the cooperative nature of the bargaining game between the three parties.
The Shapley value is a appropriate solution concept in this case since it describes a
reasonable or fair way to allocate the gains realized by cooperation between three or
more parties. Each party then receives its contribution from the (expected)
productivity gain obtained by the grand coalition.
In the following lemma we determine each party’s contribution to the player’s
transfer from club S to club L in t = 1:
Lemma 1 The Shapley values determine the outcome of the cooperative
bargaining game as follows: 1
6
E1½Sþ2  þ 13 E1½Lþ2  (player), 16 E1½Sþ2  þ 13 E1½Lþ2  (club
S) and 1
3
ðE1½Lþ2   E1½Sþ2 Þ (club L).
Proof See Appendix. h
According to the lemma the player will receive at club L a second-period salary
of
wLþr;2 ¼
1
6
E1½Sþ2  þ
1
3
E1½Lþ2 :
Club S receives as a transfer fee TS its contribution to the coalition determined by
its Shapley value and therefore realizes an expected second-period profit of
15 In this section we will only analyze case (a). The other case (b) is postponed to the Appendix.
16 Note that the subscript r stands for ‘restricted’ transfer system.
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E1½pSþr;2  ¼ 16 E1½Sþ2  þ 13 E1½Lþ2  ¼ TS: Analogously, club L receives its Shapley value
and realizes an expected second-period profit of E1½pLþr;2  ¼ 13 ðE1½Lþ2   E1½Sþ2 Þ:
(ii) If the player’s productivity has decreased during period 1 (which happens with
probability (1 - p)), we know by Eq. 1 that each type of player will achieve a
higher expected second-period productivity at his initial club S compared with
the other club L. Hence, in t = 1 club L will not place any offer for the player
since it knows that it cannot reach an agreement with club S regarding the
transfer fee and with the player regarding the player’s salary. Without a
competing offer from club L, the player will stay at club S in t = 1 and the
player’s reservation wage falls to zero. The player’s second-period salary wSr;2
is now determined by the negotiations only between club S and the player. It is
appropriate, therefore, to apply the Nash bargaining solution to derive the
outcome of this bargaining process. Club S’s utility is given by its expected
second-period profit E1½S2   wSr;2 whereas the player’s utility is given by the
salary wSr;2 he will receive at club S. The threat points of club S and the player
both amount to zero. Formally, we compute:
wSr;2 ¼ arg max
wS
r;2
ðE1½S2   wSr;2  0ÞðwSr;2  0Þ
n o
¼ 1
2
E1½S2 :
Hence, the player will earn a second-period salary of wSr;2 ¼ 12 E1½S2 ; club S
expects a second-period profit of E1½pSr;2  ¼ E1½S2   wSr;2 ¼ 12 E1½S2  and club L
will earn E1[pr,2
L-] = 0.
We can now determine the total expected utility in t = 0 of club S and the player,
respectively:
Total expected utility E0[ur
S] of the risk-neutral club S is given by the expected
first-period profit E0[pr,1
S ] plus the expected second-period profit pE1[pr,2
S+] + (1 -
p)E1[p r,2
S-]. We compute
E0½uSr  ¼ ðE0½S1  wSr;1Þ þ pTS þ ð1  pÞ
1
2
E1½S2 :
Total expected utility E0½uPr  of the risk-averse player is given by
E0½uPr  ¼ wSr;1 þ E0½wr;2 
1
2
sV ½wr;2; ð2Þ
where s measures the degree of the player’s risk-aversion. The higher s, the more
risk-averse is the player. In the first period the player receives wSr;1 with certainty.
Since the second-period salary is risky, we use the security equivalent as the
player’s expected second-period utility, where the expected second-period salary
E0½wr;2 and the variance V½wr;2 of the second-period salary are given by
E0½wr;2 ¼ pwLþr;2 þ ð1  pÞwSr;2 ¼ p
1
6
E1½Sþ2  þ
1
3
E1½Lþ2 
 
þ ð1  pÞ 1
2
E1½S2 
 
;
V ½wr;2 ¼ pðwLþr;2 Þ2 þ ð1  pÞðwSr;2Þ2  ðE0½wr;2Þ2:
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The threat points of the simultaneous negotiations in Nash bargaining fashion in
t = 0 are derived as follows: with probability (1 - p) each type of player will
achieve a higher expected second-period productivity at the small-market club S. In
the case where the player has signed a short-term contract with club L in t = 0 he
will transfer to club S in t = 1. Club S will then receive its contribution to the
coalition determined by its Shapley value. Thus the threat point of club S, denoted
dS, is given by ð1  pÞ 1
3
ðE1½S2   E1½L2 Þ: The player’s threat point, denoted d
P
; is
determined by the player’s total expected utility E0½uPr  that he could achieve by
playing at club L.
The pair of simultaneous negotiations in Nash bargaining fashion in t = 0
concerning the player’s first-period salary, denoted ðwSr;1; wLr;1Þ; are formally given
by:17
wSr;1 ¼ arg max ðE0½uSr   dSÞðE0½uPr   d
PÞ
n o
wLr;1 ¼ arg max ðE0½uLr   dLÞðE0½uPr   dPÞ
  ð3Þ
All relevant information is available to solve this problem and to specify the
player’s first-period salary wSr;1 at club S and w
L
r;1 at club L:
Lemma 2 The first-period salaries wSr;1 and w
L
r;1 of the player are computed as
wSr;1 ¼
2
3
E0½S1 þ 1
3
E0½L1 þ pTS
þ ð1  pÞðTL  1
2
E1½pSr;2 Þ þ
s
6
ðV ½wr;2  V½wr;2Þ;
ð4Þ
wLr;1 ¼
1
3
E0½S1 þ 2
3
E0½L1 þ ð1  pÞTL
þ p TS  1
2
E1½pLþr;2 
 
þ s
6
ðV ½wr;2  V ½wr;2Þ:
ð5Þ
Proof See Appendix. h
In t = 0, the risk-averse player will sign a contract with the club where he
maximizes his total expected utility:
Corollary 1
(i) A low-talented player will sign a contract with the small-market club S
independent of his degree of risk-aversion, i.e. if p 1
2
then
E0½uPr [ E0½uPr 8s[ 0:
(ii) A high-talented player will sign a contract with the large-market club L if his
risk-aversion is sufficiently low and with the small-market club S if his risk-
aversion is sufficiently high, i.e. if p [ 1
2
then E0½uPr \E0½uPr 8s\esðp; s; lÞ:
17 See the Appendix for a detailed derivation of the player’s total expected utility E0½uPr ; club L’s total
expected utility E0[ur
L] and the relevant threat points dL and dP:
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Proof See Appendix. h
The corollary shows that a low-talented, risk-averse player maximizes his total
expected utility at the small-market club S independent of his degree of risk-
aversion whereas a high-talented player only maximizes his total expected utility at
the large-market club L if his risk-aversion is sufficiently low. Intuitively this is
clear: A low-talented player will play for the club where variations of his
productivity only generate a low productivity alteration (club S), whereas a high-
talented player will play for the club where variations of his productivity generate a
high productivity alteration (club L). If, however, the risk-aversion of a high-
talented player becomes sufficiently high, then this player will also prefer to play for
the club where variations of his productivity only generate a low productivity
alteration.
3.2 Short-term contracts without the ‘shadow of the transfer system’
Similar to t = 0 in Sect. 3.1, the bargaining process concerning the player’s salary
in each of the respective periods is modelled via a pair of simultaneous negotiations,
one for each club vis-a`-vis the player, using as threat points in each negotiation what
each expects from the other. Without the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ the initial
club, however, cannot be sure either to hold the player in period 2 and obtain the
player’s second-period productivity or to transfer the player and receive a transfer
fee. The club’s expectations in t = 0 regarding the player’s second-period
productivity therefore amount to zero. Similarly, the player cannot be sure to
either stay in period 2 at his initial club and receive a second-period salary from this
club or to be transferred and obtain his Shapley value as a second-period salary from
the new club. These circumstances influence the bargaining process in t = 0 insofar
as now the player’s and the club’s expected utilities in the Nash product of the Nash
bargaining solution only involve the first period. We now determine the player’s and
club’s expected utilities in each period:
If the player signs a contract with club Z [ {S,L} in t [ {0,1}, which specifies a
salary of wu,t+1
Z , the expected utility in t [ {0,1} of the risk-neutral club is given
by18
Et½uSu;tþ1 ¼ Et½Stþ1  wSu;tþ1ðfor club SÞ;
Et½uLu;tþ1 ¼ Et½Ltþ1  wLu;tþ1ðfor club LÞ:
The player’s expected one-period utility in t [ {0,1} is given by
Et½uPu;tþ1 ¼ wSu;tþ1 and Et½uPu;tþ1 ¼ wLu;tþ1.
We derive the relevant threat points as follows: In t [ {0,1}, club S ’s threat point is
zero, whereas the threat point of the player is determined by the expected one-period
utility Et½uPu;tþ1 that he could achieve at club L. Analogously for the other Nash
bargaining solution.
18 Note that the subscript u stands for ‘unrestricted’ transfer system.
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Formally, the pair of simultaneous negotiations in t [ {0,1} is given by
wSu;tþ1 ¼ arg max ðEt½uSu;tþ1  0ÞðEt½uPu;tþ1  Et½uPu;tþ1Þ
n o
;
wLu;tþ1 ¼ arg max ðEt½uLu;tþ1  0ÞðEt½uPu;tþ1  Et½uPu;tþ1Þ
n o
:
ð6Þ
The solution to this problem is derived in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 The player’s salary wu,t+1
S and wu,t+1
L in t [ {0,1} are computed as
wSu;tþ1 ¼
2
3
Et½Stþ1 þ 1
3
Et½Ltþ1 and wLu;tþ1 ¼
1
3
Et½Stþ1 þ 2
3
Et½Ltþ1: ð7Þ
Proof Straightforward. h
We derive wu,1
S [ wu,1
L for all p 2 ð0; 1
2
 and wu,1S \ wu,1L for all p 2 ð12 ; 1Þ:19 As a
consequence, a low (high) talented player will sign a short-term contract with the
small-market (large-market) club in t = 0. The intuition is similar to that of Corollary
1. According to Lemma 3 the low-talented player then receives a first-period salary of
wSu;1 ¼
2
3
E0½S1 þ 1
3
E0½L1:
whereas, the high-talented player receives a first-period salary of
wLu;1 ¼
1
3
E0½S1 þ 2
3
E0½L1:
We now analyze the situation in t = 1:
If the player’s productivity has decreased during period 1, then according to Eq. 1
each type of player will achieve a higher second-period productivity at the small-
market club S, i.e. E1[S2
-] [ E1[L2
-], which implies wu,2
S [ wu,2
L . The player will
therefore sign a short-term contract with club S and receive, according to Lemma 3,
a second-period salary of20
wSu;2 ¼
2
3
E1½S2  þ
1
3
E1½L2 :
If the player’s productivity has increased during period 1, then in t = 1 each type of
player will sign a short-term contract with club L and receive according to Lemma 3
a second-period salary of
wLþu;2 ¼
1
3
E1½Sþ2  þ
2
3
E1½Lþ2 :
Under short-term contracts without the ‘shadow of the transfer system,’ the
player cannot be sure in t = 0 either to stay in period 2 at his initial club and receive
a second-period salary from this club or to be transferred and obtain his Shapley
19 It holds: wSu;1 [ w
L
u;1 , E0½S1[ E0½L1: Since l [ s, we derive E0½S1[ E0½L1 , p 2 ð0; 12Þ and
E0½S1\E0½L1 , p 2 ð12 ; 1Þ: Without loss of generality, we assume that the small-market club S
contracts a low-talented player with p ¼ 1
2
:
20 We can omit the underline and the upperline, since the second-period salary is equal for each type of
player.
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value as a second-period salary from the new club. Nevertheless, the player can
form expectations in t = 0 about his utility over the two periods. Depending on his
type, the player will receive wu,1
S or wu,1
L in the first period with certainty. With
probability p, the (low- and high-talented) player will sign a contract in t = 1 at club
L and receive wu,2
L+. With probability (1 - p) the (low- and high-talented) player will
sign a contract in t = 1 at club S and receive wu,2
S-. Hence, the player’s expected
second-period salary E0[wu,2] and the variance V[wu,2] of the second-period salary
are determined by21
E0½wu;2 ¼ pwLþu;2 þ ð1  pÞwSu;2
¼ p 1
3
E1½Sþ2  þ
2
3
E1½Lþ2 
 
þ ð1  pÞ 2
3
E1½S2  þ
1
3
E1½L2 
 
;
V ½wu;2 ¼ pðwLþu;2Þ2 þ ð1  pÞðwSu;2Þ2  ðE1½wu;2Þ2:
In t = 0, total expected utility, denoted E0½uPu  for a low-talented player and
E0½uPu  for a high-talented player, is analogous to Sect. 3.1 computed as
E0½uPu  ¼ wSu;1 þ E0½wu;2 
1
2
sV ½wu;2;
E0½uPu  ¼ wLu;1 þ E0½wu;2 
1
2
sV ½wu;2:
3.3 In versus out of the ‘shadow of the transfer system’
In this section we compare the player’s salary under a short-term contract in the
‘shadow of the transfer system’ with the respective salary under a short-term
contract without the ‘shadow of the transfer system’. Moreover, we show that a risk-
averse player benefits from the ’shadow of the transfer system’.
Proposition 1 Under a short-term contract in the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ a
high-talented, risk-averse player receives a higher first-period salary combined with
a lower (expected) second-period salary compared with a short-term contract
without the ‘shadow of the transfer system’. The same holds true for a low-talented
player whose risk-aversion is sufficiently low. Formally,
(i) Low-talented player: wSr;1 [ w
S
u;18s\s and E0½wr;2\E0½wu;2;
(ii) High-talented player: wLr;1 [ w
L
u;18s [ 0 and E0½wr;2\E0½wu;2:
Proof See Appendix. h
The proposition shows that for a high-talented player and a low-talented player
(whose risk-aversion is sufficiently low), the risk-free first-period salary under a
short-term contract in the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ is higher than the
respective salary without the ‘shadow of the transfer system’. The opposite holds
true for the expected second-period salary of a (low- or high-talented) player since it
21 Note that the expected second-period salary and variance are equal for a low- and a high-talented
player.
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is higher without the ‘shadow of the transfer system’. The intuition behind this
result is as follows: The ‘shadow of the transfer system’ gives the player an
instrument to commit himself successfully not to renege on the insurance deal since
the club can be sure that the player only leaves its portfolio in t = 1 if the transfer
fee exceeds the expected profit that the player could achieve by staying at the club in
period 2. As a consequence a risk-neutral club can partially insure its risk-averse
player against income uncertainty by transforming a part of the player’s risky future
(second-period) salary in risk-free current (first period) salary.
In the next proposition we show that a risk-averse player benefits from the
‘shadow of the transfer system’ and therefore from a more restrictive transfer system:
Proposition 2 Total expected utility of a low- and high-talented, risk-averse player
is higher under a short-term contract in the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ than
under a short-term contract without the ‘shadow of the transfer system’. Formally,
ðiÞ Lowtalented player : E0½uPr [ E0½uPu 8s[ 0;
ðiiÞHightalented player : E0½uPr [ E0½uPu 8s[ 0:
Proof See Appendix. h
The above proposition shows that a risk-averse player benefits from the ‘shadow
of the transfer system’ since a risk-averse player prefers a higher current salary
combined with a lower (expected) future salary to a lower current salary combined
with a higher but uncertain future salary.
4 The ‘shadow of the transfer system’ in the pre-Bosman, Bosman and Monti
transfer system
As a point of departure we have to take into account the fact that labour law cannot be
employed in reality to prevent an employee from accepting superior alternative job
offers. In addition to this let us assume a situation where the ‘shadow of the transfer
system’ does not exist. This means that the weak or inexistent ‘shadow of the law’ is
supplemented by an inexistent ‘shadow of the transfer system’. Will a Pareto efficient
contract that creates value by enabling risk-averse players to buy insurance against
future income uncertainty from risk-neutral clubs be feasible in this setting?
Given the inexistent (or at least very weak) external enforcement system, the
insurance deal between player and club will only work if the contract written down
in period one is time-consistent. The insurance deal is to be regarded as a series of
one-period contracts. After each period the parties re-calculate the terms of the next
one-period contract taking into account the information available at the beginning of
the respective period. In the absence of both the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ and
the ‘shadow of the law’ a Pareto efficient contract enabling risk-averse players to
buy insurance from risk-neutral clubs is unlikely to be achieved. Nothing prevents a
‘good risk’ player whose productivity turns out to be underestimated in the course of
his career to use external offers in order to bid his salary to a level reflecting
marginal productivity. Why should a ‘good risk’ player still agree to pay the
‘insurance fee’ established in the original contract in this setting? Why should clubs
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offer value-creating insurance services if they are not able to appropriate any of this
value because of a regulatory environment leaving them with all the ‘bad risks?’
How does the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ change this situation?
Let us first assume the pre-Bosman world. All employment relations in football
are governed by the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ in this world. Players out-of-
contract as well as players in-contract require the permission of their current club in
order to be able to sign with another club. The ‘shadow of the transfer system’ works
as a surrogate which makes insurance contracts complete. Let a ‘good risk’ player
whose productivity has been underestimated receive an external transfer offer. Player
and club will of course re-calculate their deal taking into account the new
information available. However the ‘good risk’ player cannot defect on the insurance
deal. As was shown in Sect. 3.1 the club can be sure that the player only leaves its
portfolio at the beginning of the next period if the transfer fee exceeds the expected
profit that the player could contribute by staying with the club in the future. In the
‘shadow of the transfer system’ the Pareto efficient contract is time-consistent.
Although contracts may be renegotiated every period in the pre-Bosman world on the
basis of new information available, these renegotiations cannot be used to defect on
the insurance deal. Enabling the player to commit to the insurance deal the ‘shadow
of the transfer system’ allows clubs to transfer risky future income in risk-less current
income and make risk-averse players better off as has been shown in Sect. 3.3. Seen
from this insurance perspective, contract duration is not important in the pre-Bosman
world since the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ effectively links one-period contracts
to a time-consistent series. Even if the actual contract of the player expires at the end
of the current period his promise not to use an external offer in order to defect on the
‘insurance fee’ remains perfectly credible in the ‘shadow of the transfer system’.
The Bosman verdict transforms the potential promise of a player not to defect on the
insurance deal after the expiration of his contract into cheap talk. The ‘shadow of the
transfer system’ only continues to provide credibility to player promises given within
the time-span of valid contracts. Contract duration becomes a crucial variable for the
functioning of the insurance market. By expanding contract duration employment
relationships can be deliberately taken under the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ where
commitments to honor the insurance deals work. This is exactly what happened
between clubs and players on a perfectly voluntary basis. Despite the fact that the
players had the choice to become free agents outside the ‘shadow of the transfer
system’ and the clubs had the choice to sign these free agents, the bulk of all transfer
activity took place within the ‘shadow of the transfer system’. Clubs and players
restored the pre-Bosman situation on the insurance market by expanding contract
durations. In terms of the model this intuition is captured by switching from Sect. 3.2
back to Sect. 3.1.22 A long-term contract which covers the player’s career horizon of
two periods specifies a salary for each period, given by (w1, w2). In our model, a long-
term contract is equivalent to the short-term contract in the ‘shadow of the transfer
system’ described in Sect. 3.1, where the first-period salary w1 is given by w1 ¼ wSr;1 or
w1 ¼ wLr;1; dependent of the player’s type. The second-period salary w2 is given for a
22 In other words, in our model the Bosman transfer system can always resemble the pre-Bosman world
by adjusting the contract length accordingly. Note that this does not hold the other way round.
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low-talented player by w2 ¼ wSr;2 or w2 ¼ wLþr;2 (for a high-talented player by w2 ¼
wSr;2 or w2 ¼ wLþr;2 ), dependent on the development of the player’s productivity during
period 1. By signing a long-term contract, the club can be sure to either hold the player
and obtain the player’s second-period productivity or to transfer the player and receive
a transfer fee. This expected second-period productivity increases the player’s
productivity in t = 0 and should also be incorporated in the contractually specified
first-period salary of a long-term contract. The calculation of the player’s first-period
salary in Sect. 3.1 effectively incorporates the player’s expected second-period
productivity. Furthermore, the second-period salary of a long-term should reflect the
player’s expected development during period 1, which is the case in Sect. 3.1.
The Monti system limits the voluntary attempt of clubs and players to take
employment relations under the ‘shadow of the transfer system’. The maximum
duration of contracts is 5 years. Contracts that are signed up the 28th birthday of the
player are protected against unilateral breach for the first 3 years. Contracts that are
signed thereafter are only protected for 2 years.23 The ’shadow of the transfer
system’ will only work for these three respectively 2 years. After the ‘protected
period’ only a ‘scattered shadow of the transfer system’ will be effective. The
transfer fee for players-in-contact shall reflect whether contracts are broken in the
‘protected period’. No transfer fee can be charged for players out-of-contract. Our
model captures the intuition behind the changes from the Bosman to the Monti world
by a switch from Sect. 3.1 to 3.2. Risk-averse players will find it more difficult to put
up insurance deals with clubs. Clubs will face greater problems to convert risky
future income in risk-less current income in a world where players cannot make
longer-term commitments to honor insurance deals. Outside the remaining small
‘shadow of the transfer system’ their promises are bound to be cheap talk.
5 Conclusion
Transfer restrictions have a long tradition in professional football, but came under
heavy attack in recent years. In this paper we have analyzed whether a risk-averse
player really benefits from less restrictive transfer systems. Given that the player’s
productivity varies significantly during his career and taking into account that these
variations cannot be predicted, the allocation of risk becomes a crucial feature. Our
model, which captures this important aspect of employment relations in football, has
revealed that a risk-averse player benefits from ‘the shadow of the transfer system’
and therefore from a more restrictive transfer system. Under the pre-Bosman
23 The Monti system, however, did not clearly specify the compensation for transfers after the protected
period. The current club could retain a strong bargaining position by charging high transfer fees for in-
contract players who wanted to transfer after the protected period. In January 2008, the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) based in Lausanne, Switzerland, effectively limited the bargaining power of a
player’s current club for transfers after the protected period with its ruling on the Webster case. This case
was brought before the CAS after the Scottish football player Webster decided to leave his Scottish club
Heart of Midlothian in 2006 in order to move to the English club Wigan 1 year before his contract ended,
but after the protected period. The CAS decided that Webster had to pay his residual value to Heart of
Midlothian. More importantly, the CAS also ruled that this residual value is not based on the player’s
market value, but is equal to the player’s salary for the remainder of his contract.
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transfer system, clubs could partially insure their players against income uncertainty
by transforming a part of the player’s risky future salary in risk-free current income.
A risk-averse player prefers a higher current salary combined with a lower
(expected) future salary to a lower current salary combined with a higher but
uncertain future salary. The Bosman transfer system, which is equivalent to the pre-
Bosman transfer system in terms of our model, did not change this situation since
clubs and players voluntary restored the pre-Bosman world by expanding contract
durations. However, by limiting the maximal contract duration to 5 years the
insurance deal does not work anymore in the new Monti transfer system. As a
consequence, the Monti transfer system can be considered as an impediment to
Pareto efficient risk-allocation in the football industry. If risk can be considered as
the basic source of productivity variations in football, the failure of the insurance
market imposed by the free movement philosophy of the European institutions
might impose a high price to be paid by the labour force in this industry.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We will show how the (expected) productivity gain that is generated through the
player’s transfer from club S to club L in t = 1 will be divided between the player,
club S and club L:
The Shapley value gives each member i of a coalition C her expected
contribution, where the expectation is taken over all coalitions to which i might
belong. Formally, party i’s share of the pie is given by
X
Cji2C
ðc  1Þ!ðn  cÞ!
n!
vðCÞ  vðC=figð Þ;
where c = |C| is the number of parties in coalition C, n is the total number of parties
bargaining, v(C) is the surplus produced by coalition C , and v(C/{i}) is the surplus
produced by coalition C without party i.
First, we compute the share of the player: Without the player, neither of the two
clubs can generate any surplus. Together with the player, club S can generate a
surplus of v({P,S}) = E1[S2
+]. The respective probability of this coalition is 1/6. The
player and club L cannot generate any surplus, because they need the consent of
club S, i.e. v({P,L}) = 0. The coalition of club S and club L cannot generate any
surplus, i.e. v({S,L}) = 0. The coalition of the two clubs and the player will
generate a surplus of v({P,S,L}) = E1[L2
+]. The respective probability of this
coalition is 1/3. As a result, the player’s Shapley value is 1
6
E1½Sþ2  þ 13 E1½Lþ2 :
Club S’s situation is symmetric to the player’s. Accordingly, club S’s Shapley
value is 1
6
E1½Sþ2  þ 13 E1½Lþ2 :
Club L needs the grand coalition to generate a surplus of E1[L2
+]. Without club L,
club S and the player can generate a surplus of only E1[S2
+]. Hence, club L’s Shapley
value is (E1[L2
+]-E1[S2
+]).
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Proof of Lemma 2
The player’s first-period salary wSr;1 and w
L
r;1 are determined by the simultaneous
negotiations (3) which are modelled in Nash bargaining fashion, one for each club
vis-a`-vis the player. Deriving the corresponding FOC and solving for wSr;1 and w
L
r;1;
respectively, yields
wSr;1 ¼
1
4
ð2E0½S1 þ ð1  pÞE1½L2  þ pE1½Lþ2  þ sðV½wr;2  V½wr;2Þ þ 2wLr;1Þ;
wLr;1 ¼
1
4
ð2E0½L1 þ ð1  pÞE1½S2  þ pE1½Sþ2  þ sðV ½wr;2  V½wr;2Þ þ 2wSr;1Þ:
By solving this system of equations and using the fact that E1½pSþr;2  ¼ 16 E1½Sþ2  þ
1
3
E1½Lþ2  ¼ TS; E1½pLþr;2  ¼ 13 ðE1½Lþ2   E1½Sþ2 Þ; E1½pSr;2  ¼ 13 ðE1½S2   E1½L2 Þ and
E1½pLr;2  ¼ 13 E1½S2  þ 16 E1½L2  ¼ TL; we derive (4) and (5).
Proof of Corollary 1
We claim that in t = 0, total expected utility of a low-talented player is higher at
club S than at club L. The reverse is shown to hold true for a high-talented player
with a sufficiently low risk-aversion.
If the player signs a short-term contract in t = 0 at club S, then according to (2)
the player’s total expected utility is given by E0½uPr  ¼ wSr;1 þ E0½wr;2  12 sV ½wr;2:
In the other case, the player’s total expected utility is given by E0½uPr  ¼
wLr;1 þ E0½wr;2  12 sV ½wr;2 according to (8). In order to prove our claim, we have to
show that E0½uPr [ E0½uPr  for p 12 and E0½uPr \E0½uPr  for p [ 12 : We define f ðsÞ :¼ E0½uPr   E0½uPr  and compute
E0½uPr   E0½uPr  ¼ 0 , s ¼ esðp; s; lÞ :¼
18ð2p  1Þ
ð1  pÞpðsð5  4pÞ þ lð1 þ 4pÞÞ ;
oðE0½uPr   E0½uPr Þ
os
¼ ðl  sÞ
54
ð1  pÞpðsð5  4pÞ þ lð1 þ 4pÞÞ[ 0; 8p 2 ð0; 1Þ:
We derive that if s [esðp; s; lÞ; then E0½uPr [ E0½uPr :
Let p 2 ð0; 1
2
; then esðp; s; lÞ 0 and hence E0½uPr [ E0½uPr [ 08s [ 0: That is, a
low-talented, risk-averse player ðp 1
2
Þ; independent of his risk-aversion, realizes a
higher total expected utility by signing a contract with club S in t = 0. Note that
es ¼ 0 for p ¼ 1
2
:
Let p 2 ð1
2
; 1Þ; then esðp; s; lÞ[ 0 and hence E0½uPr \E0½uPr  8s\esðp; s; lÞ: That
is, a high-talented, risk-averse player ðp [ 1
2
Þ with a sufficiently low risk-aversion
ðs\esðp; s; lÞÞ realizes a higher total expected utility by signing a contract with club
L in t = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) We claim that the risk-free first-period salary under a short-term contract in the
‘shadow of the transfer system’ is higher than the respective salary without the
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‘shadow of the transfer system’ for a high-talented player. The same holds true
for a low-talented player whose risk-aversion is sufficiently low. Formally, we
show wSr;1 [ w
S
u;1 if s\ s
*(p, e0, s,l) and w
L
r;1 [ w
L
u;1 for all s[ 0.
For a low-talented player, we derive
wSr;1 [ w
S
u;1 , pTS þ ð1  pÞ TL 
1
2
E1½pSr;2 
 
þ s
6
ðV ½wr;2  V ½wr;2Þ[ 0
and compute
wSr;1  wSu;1 ¼ 0 , s ¼ sðp; e0; s; lÞ :¼
9ð3e0  ð1  pÞð4s þ 2lÞÞ
ðl  sÞð1  pÞpðsð5  4pÞ þ lð1 þ 4pÞÞ :
We deduce that s*(p,e0,s,l) [ 0 since we assumed e0 [ 2l(1 - p) and l [ s.
Moreover,
oðwSr;1  wSu;1Þ
os
¼ ðl  sÞ
54
ð1  pÞpðsð5  4pÞ þ lð1 þ 4pÞÞ\0:
Hence, if s\ s*(p, e0, s,l), then wSr;1 [ w
S
u;1: A low-talented risk-averse player
whose risk-aversion is sufficiently low realizes a higher risk-free first-period salary
in the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ than without the ‘shadow of the transfer
system’.
For a high-talented player, we derive
wLr;1 [ w
L
u;1 , ð1  pÞTL þ pðTS 
1
2
E1½pLþr;2 Þ þ
s
6
ðV ½wr;2  V ½wr;2Þ
and compute
wLr;1  wLu;1 , s ¼ sðp; e0; s; lÞ\0;
oðwLr;1  wLu;1Þ
os
¼ ðl  sÞ
54
ð1  pÞpðsð5  4pÞ þ lð1 þ 4pÞÞ[ 0:
We deduce that if s[ 0 [ s*(p,e0,s,l), then wLr;1 [ w
L
u;1: A high-talented, risk-averse
player, independent of his risk-aversion, realizes a higher risk-free first-period
salary in the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ than without the ‘shadow of the
transfer system’. This proves the claim.
(ii) We claim that the expected second-period salary under a short-term contract in
the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ is lower than the respective salary without
the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ for both, a low and a high-talented player.
We derive that E0½wr;2\E0½wu;2 and E0½wr;2\E0½wu;2 hold if the following
inequalities are fulfilled:
p
1
6
E1½Sþ2  þ
1
3
E1½Lþ2 
 
þ ð1  pÞ 1
6
E1½S2  þ
1
3
E1½L2 
 
[ 0;
p
1
3
E1½Sþ2  þ
1
6
E1½Lþ2 
 
þ ð1  pÞ 1
3
E1½S2  þ
1
6
E1½L2 
 
[ 0:
This proves the claim, since all terms are positive.
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Proof of Proposition 2
We claim that both a low- and a high-talented, risk-averse player benefits from the
‘shadow of the transfer system’. In order to prove the claim, we show that total
expected utility of each type of risk-averse player is higher under a short-term
contract in the ‘shadow of the transfer system’ than under a short-term contract
without the ‘shadow of the transfer system’. Formally, we show that
E0½uPr [ E0½uPu  and E0½uPr [ E0½uPu  for all s[ 0.
(i) We compute for a low-talented player:
E0½uPr   E0½uPu  ¼ 0 , s ¼ 0;
oðE0½uPr   E0½uPu Þ
os
¼ 1
54
ð1  pÞpð2s2ð13  8pÞ þ 4slð11  pÞ þ l2ð11 þ 20pÞÞ:
We derive
oðE0½uPr E0½uPu Þ
os [ 0; 8p 2 ð0; 1=2 and thus if s[ 0, then
E0½uPr [ E0½uPu :
(ii) We compute for a high-talented player:
E0½uPr   E0½uPu  ¼ 0 , s ¼ 0;
oðE0½uPr   E0½uPu Þ
os
¼ 1
54
ð1  pÞpðs2ð31  20pÞ þ 4slð10 þ pÞ þ 2l2ð5 þ 8pÞÞ:
We derive
oðE0½uPr E0½uPu Þ
os [ 0; 8p 2 ð1=2; 1Þ and thus if s[ 0, then
E0½uPr [ E0½uPu : For a high-talented player must additionally hold s\esðp; s; lÞ;
since in Corollary 1 we have restricted the risk-aversion of a high-talented player in
order to guarantee that the player signs a contract with club L in t = 0. This proves
the claim.
Derivation of the player’s and club L’s total expected utility in t = 0
This section of the appendix contains the derivation of the player’s and club L’s
total expected utility for the case that the player has signed a short-term contract
with club L in t = 0.
(i) If the player’s productivity has increased during period 1 (which happens
with probability p), we know by Eq. 1 that each type of player will achieve a
higher expected second-period productivity at his initial club L compared
with the other club S. In t = 1, club S will not place any offer and the player
will therefore stay at club L. Without a competing offer from club S, the
player will stay at club L in t = 1 and the player’s reservation wage falls to
zero. Similar to Sect. 3.1, the player’s second-period salary is now
determined by the negotiations only between club L and the player via Nash
bargaining:
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wLþr;2 ¼ arg max
wLþr;2
ðE1½Lþ2   wLþr;2  0ÞðwLþr;2  0Þ ¼
1
2
E1½Lþ2 :
Club L then expects a second-period profit of E1½pLþr;2  ¼ E1½Lþ2   wLþr;2 ¼ 12 E1½Lþ2 
and club S will earn E1[pr,2
S+] = 0.
(ii) If the player’s productivity has decreased during period 1 (which happens with
probability (1 - p)), we know by Eq. 1 that each type of player will achieve a
higher expected second-period productivity at club S compared with club L.
According to the Coase theorem the player will be transferred from club L to
club S. Similar to Sect. 3.1 the following lemma determines each party’s
contribution to the player’s transfer from club L to club S in t = 1:
Lemma 4 The Shapley values determine the outcome of the cooperative
bargaining game as follows: 1
3
E1½S2  þ 16 E1½L2  (player), 13 ðE1½S2   E1½L2 Þ (club
S) and 1
3
E1½S2  þ 16 E1½L2  (club L).
Proof Analogous to Lemma 1. h
Thus, the player will receive at club S a second-period salary of
wSr;2 ¼
1
3
E1½S2  þ
1
6
E1½L2 :
Club L receives as a transfer fee TLand realizes an expected second-period profit of
E1½pLr;2  ¼ 13 E1½S2  þ 16 E1½L2  ¼ TL: Club S similarly obtains its Shapley value and
realizes an expected second-period profit of E1½pSr;2  ¼ 13 ðE1½S2   E1½L2 Þ:
Analogous to Sect. 3.1, in t = 0, club L’s total expected utility, denoted E0[ur
L], is
given by
E0½uLr  ¼ E0½pLr;1 þ pE1½pLþr;2  þ ð1  pÞE1½pLr;2 ;
with an expected first-period profit of E0½pLr;1 ¼ E0½L1  wLr;1:
In t = 0, the player’s total expected utility, denoted E0½uPr ; is given by
E0½uPr  ¼ wLr;1 þ E½wr;2 
1
2
sV½wr;2;
where the expected second-period salary E0½wr;2 and the variance V ½wr;2 of the
second-period salary are given by
E0½wr;2 ¼ pwLþr;2 þ ð1  pÞwSr;2 ;
V½wr;2 ¼ pðwLþr;2 Þ2 þ ð1  pÞðwSr;2Þ2  ðE½wr;2Þ2:
Similar to Sect. 3.1, the threat points of the simultaneous negotiations in Nash
bargaining fashion in t = 0 are derived as follows: with probability p each type of
player will achieve a higher expected second-period productivity at the large-market
club L. In case that the player has signed a short-term contract with club S in t = 0
he will transfer to club L in t = 1. Club L will then receive its contribution to the
coalition determined by its Shapley value. Thus club L’s threat point, denoted dL, is
given by p 1
3
ðE1½Lþ2   E1½Sþ2 Þ: The player’s threat point, denoted dP; is determined
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by the player’s total expected utility E0½uPr  that he could achieve by playing at the
other club S.
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